Isolating residents including wandering residents in care and group homes: Medical ethics and English law in the context of Covid-19.

This article investigates the lawfulness of isolating residents of care and group homes during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many residents are mobile, and their freedom to move is a central ethical tenet and human right. It is not however an absolute right and trade-offs between autonomy, liberty and health need to be made since COVID-19 is highly infectious and poses serious risks of critical illness and death. People living in care and group homes may be particularly vulnerable because recommended hygiene practices are difficult for them and many residents are elderly, and/or have co-morbidities. In some circumstances, the trade-offs can be made easily with the agreement of the resident and for short periods of time. However challenging cases arise, in particular for residents and occupants with dementia who 'wander', meaning they have a strong need to walk, sometimes due to agitation, as may also be the case for some people with developmental disability (e.g. autism), or as a consequence of mental illness. This article addresses three central questions: (1) in what circumstances is it lawful to isolate residents of social care homes to prevent transmission of COVID-19, in particular where the resident has a strong compulsion to walk and will not, or cannot, remain still and isolated? (2) what types of strategies are lawful to curtail walking and achieve isolation and social distancing? (3) is law reform required to ensure any action to restrict freedoms is lawful and not excessive? These questions emerged during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and are still relevant. Although focussed on COVID-19, the results are also relevant to other future outbreaks of infectious diseases in care and group homes. Likewise, while we concentrate on the law in England and Wales, the analysis and implications have international significance.

COVID-19, Moral Conflict, Distress, and Dying Alone.

COVID-19 has truly affected most of the world over the past many months, perhaps more than any other event in recent history. In the wake of this pandemic are patients, family members, and various types of care providers, all of whom share different levels of moral distress. Moral conflict occurs in disputes when individuals or groups have differences over, or are unable to translate to each other, deeply held beliefs, knowledge, and values. Such conflicts can seriously affect healthcare providers and cause distress during disastrous situations such as pandemics when medical and human resources are stretched to the point of exhaustion. In the current pandemic, most hospitals and healthcare institutions in the United States have not allowed visitors to come to the hospitals to see their family or loved ones, even when the patient is dying. The moral conflict and moral distress (being constrained from doing what you think is right) among care providers when they see their patients dying alone can be unbearable and lead to ongoing grief and sadness. This paper will explore the concepts of moral distress and conflict among hospital staff and how a system-wide provider wellness programme can make a difference in healing and health.

[Humanize Death in a Time of Sanitary Crisis: Accompanied Die, Farewell and Receive Spiritual Care]. / Humanizar la Muerte en Tiempos de Crisis Sanitaria: Morir Acompañado, Despedirse y Recibir Atención Espiritual.

The crisis in the health system caused by COVID-19 has left some important humanitarian deficits on how to care for the sick in their last days of life. The humanization of the dying process has been affected in three fundamental aspects, each of which constitutes a medical and ethical duty necessary. In this study, I analyze why dying accompanied, with the possibility of saying goodbye and receiving spiritual assistance, constitutes a specific triad of care and natural obligations that should not be overlooked - even in times of health crisis - if we do not want to see human dignity violated and violated some fundamental rights derived from it.

Family Presence for Patients and Separated Relatives During COVID-19: Physical, Virtual, and Surrogate.

During an outbreak or pandemic involving a novel disease such as COVID-19, infected persons may need to undergo strict medical isolation and be separated from their families for public health reasons. Such a practice raises various ethical questions, the characteristics of which are heightened by uncertainties such as mode of transmission and increasingly scarce healthcare resources. For example, under what circumstances should non-infected parents be allowed to stay with their infected children in an isolation facility? This paper will examine ethical issues with three modes of "family presence" or "being there or with" a separated family member during the current COVID-19 pandemic: physical, virtual, and surrogate. Physical visits, stays, or care by family members in isolation facilities are usually prohibited, discouraged, or limited to exceptional circumstances. Virtual presence for isolated patients is often recommended and used to enable communication. When visits are disallowed, frontline workers sometimes act as surrogate family for patients, such as performing bedside vigils for dying patients. Drawing on lessons from past outbreaks such as the 2002-2003 SARS epidemic and the recent Ebola epidemic in West Africa, we consider the ethical management of these modes of family presence and argue for the promotion of physical presence under some conditions.

Isolation of patients in psychiatric hospitals in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic: An ethical, legal, and practical challenge.

Psychiatric inpatients are particularly vulnerable to the transmission and effects of COVID-19. As such, healthcare providers should implement measures to prevent its spread within mental health units, including adequate testing, cohorting, and in some cases, the isolation of patients. Respiratory isolation imposes a significant limitation on an individual's right to liberty, and should be accompanied by appropriate legal safeguards. This paper explores the implications of respiratory isolation in English law, considering the applicability of the common law doctrine of necessity, the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Mental Health Act 1983, and public health legislation. We then interrogate the practicality of currently available approaches by applying them to a series of hypothetical cases. There are currently no 'neat' or practicable solutions to the problem of lawfully isolating patients on mental health units, and we discuss the myriad issues with both mental health and public health law approaches to the problem. We conclude by making some suggestions to policymakers.